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I.

INTRODUCTION

O
I

n September 2, 1945, Japan formally1 surrendered to the Allied Powers on board the USS Missouri (BB 63) anchored in Tokyo Bay, thus ending
World War II.2 For the next seven years, U.S. forces, under the command
of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers (SCAP), occupied Japan, enacting “widespread military, political,
economic and social reforms” to establish Japan as a peaceful and demo Captain Pedrozo (U.S. Navy, Ret.) is the Deputy General Counsel for the Defense
POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Previously he was a Professor of International Law in
the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College,
where he now serves as a Non-Resident Scholar. Prior to his retirement from the U.S.
Navy, he served in a number of key positions, including Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Pacific
Command, and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The views
expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government, the Department
of Defense, Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College.
1. The Emperor of Japan publicly announced the surrender of Japan on August 15,
1945.
2. Instrument of Surrender (Sept. 2, 1945), https://www.archives.gov/exhibits
/featured_documents/japanese_surrender_document/.
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cratic nation.3 Although other major allies had an advisory role in the occupation as part of the Allied Council, MacArthur had the final say on all
matters.4
In September 1950, President Harry Truman directed Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles to begin consultations with other governments to conclude a peace treaty with Japan.5 After a year of painstaking negotiations,
over fifty nations assembled in San Francisco on September 4, 1951, to
discuss and conclude the treaty. Missing from the negotiations were, inter
alia, the two Chinas and the two Koreas.6 Four days later, forty-eight nations signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan (the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or SFPT), formally ending the state of war between Japan and the Allied
Powers and recognizing Japan’s sovereignty.7 The Soviet Union, Poland
and Yugoslavia participated in the conference, but refused to sign the treaty.8 Taiwan and India signed separate peace treaties with Japan in April
1952 and June 1952, respectively, and the Soviet Union signed a Joint Declaration with Japan in 1956, ending the state of war and restoring diplomatic relations.9
Articles 2 and 3 of the SFPT additionally purported to settle a number
of outstanding territorial issues. Japan renounced all right, title and claim
to, inter alia, Korea (including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and
Dagelet); Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores; the Kurile Islands; and the
portion of Sakhalin Island and its adjacent islands over which Japan ac3. Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan 1945–52, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruc
tion (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
4. Id.
5. Harry S. Truman, President, Address in San Francisco at the Opening of the Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, 7 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 504 (Sept. 4,
1951), https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=432&st=&st1=.
6. Other nations that were not invited or did not send a representative to the conference included Italy, Burma, India and Yugoslavia. C. Peter Chen, San Francisco Peace Conference, WORLD WAR II DATABASE, http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=316 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2016); John Price, A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective (Japan Policy Research Institute, JPRI Working Paper No. 78, 2001),
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp78.html.
7. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 1(a)–(b), Sept. 8, 1951 (entered into force Apr. 28,
1952), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter SFPT].
8. Chen, supra note 6.
9. John Dower, The San Francisco System: Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan-China Relations, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2014), http://japanfocus.org/-John_W_-Dower/
4079.
OF THE
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quired sovereignty in 1905 under the Treaty of Portsmouth.10 Japan also
gave the United States control over Nansei Shoto (including the Ryukyu
Islands (Okinawa) and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands), and Parece Vela and
Marcus Island.11
Although Japan renounced its claims to these lands, the treaty failed to
declare a successor State. Thus, five of the highly contentious territorial
disputes that plague Asia-Pacific today have their roots in the SFPT, three
of which involve Japan—Kurile Islands/Northern Territories, Liancourt
Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) and Pinnacle Islands (Diaoyu/Senkakus).12
Over the years, these disputes have intensified as a result of rising nationalism and a growing demand for living and non-living ocean resources. In
particular, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,13 which were designed to accommodate the interests of the developing States in exercising exclusive
resource rights out to two hundred nautical miles (nm), have had the unintended consequence of intensifying resource competition and rekindling
these long-standing territorial disputes.
II.

SOUTHERN KURILE ISLANDS/NORTHERN TERRITORIES
(RUSSIAN FEDERATION V. JAPAN)

The northern boundary between Japan (Etorofu) and Russia (Uruppu) was
established by the 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation
between Japan and Russia.14 Islands to the south of the boundary line—
10. SFPT, supra note 7, art. 2(a)–(c).
11. Article 3 provides that
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and
the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a
proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise
all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Id.
12. Dower, supra note 9.
13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55–75, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
14. Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia, Japan-Russ., Feb. 7, 1855, 112 Consol. T.S. 467. See also Joint Compendium of Documents on the
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Etorofu, Habomai, Kunashiri and Shikotan—were Japanese territory;
Uruppu and all islands north of the boundary were Russian territory. In
1875, Russia ceded all of the Kurile Islands from Uruppu to Shumush
(south of the Kamchatka Peninsula) to Japan in exchange for Japanese
rights to Sakhalin Island.15 In 1895, Japan and Russia signed a new Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation, which superseded the 1855 Treaty and reaffirmed the boundary line established in the 1875 Treaty.16 In the Treaty of
Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, Russia ceded part of
Sakhalin Island (south of the 50th parallel North) to Japan.17 Twenty years
later, when Japan and the Soviet Union (also referred to as the USSR) esHistory of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN
(Mar. 1, 2001), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/in
dex.html [hereinafter Joint Compendium of Documents].
15. Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands, Japan-Russ., art. 2,
May 7, 1875, 149 Consol. T.S. 179, Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“In
exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin) . . . ,
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias . . . cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of the islands, called Kurile . . . , together with all the rights of sovereignty
appertaining to this possession, so that henceforth all the Kurile Islands shall belong to
the Empire of Japan and the boundary between the Empires of Japan and Russia in these
areas shall pass through the Strait between Cape Lopatka of the Peninsula of Kamchatka
and the island of Shumushu. The Kurile Islands comprises the following eighteen islands:
1) Shumushu, 2) Araido, 3) Paramushiru, 4) Makanrushi, 5) Onekotan, 6) Harimukotan, 7)
Ekaruma, 8) Shasukotan, 9) Mushiru, 10) Raikoke, 11) Matsua, 12) Rasutsua, 13) the islets
of Suredonewa and Ushishiru, 14) Ketoi, 15) Shimushiru, 16) Buroton, 17) the islets of
Cherupoi and Brat Cherupoefu and 18) Uruppu.”).
16. Treaty on Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia, Japan-Russ., art.
18, June 8, 1895, Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“This treaty . . . shall
replace the following documents: the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation
. . . 1855; the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce . . . 1858; the convention signed on . . .
December 11, 1867; and all additional agreements attached to the above.”). An attached
Declaration further provided:
The parties . . . declare that Article 18 of the treaty . . . does not relate either to the treaty
signed on . . . May 7, 1875 between His Majesty the Japanese Emperor and His Majesty
the All Russian Emperor, or to the appendix, signed at Tokyo on August 10 (22) of the
same year. The said treaty and article . . . remain in force.

Id.
17. Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan-Russ., art. 9, Sept. 5, 1905, 199 Consol. T.S. 144
(“The Imperial Russian Government shall cede to the Imperial Government of Japan, in
perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern portion of the island of Sakhalin, and all the
islands adjacent thereto, as well as all the public works and properties there situated. The
fiftieth degree of north latitude shall be adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded
territory.”).
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tablished diplomatic relations, the USSR agreed that the Treaty of Portsmouth remained in force.18
The situation remained unchanged until the Soviet Union declared war
on Japan on August 9, 1945, and Soviet forces occupied the Northern Territories. The islands were subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union
by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Creation of the South-Sakhalin Province in the Khabarovsk Region on February 2, 1946.19 Since then, Japan has argued that continued Russian occupation of the islands is illegal, citing a series of World War II and post-war
documents.
In the Atlantic Charter, the United States and Great Britain affirmed
that the Allies, inter alia, did not seek “aggrandizement, territorial or other”
and that the Allies desired “to see no territorial changes that do not accord
with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”20 The USSR
acceded to the Charter on September 2, 1941. Similarly, in the Cairo Declaration, which the Soviet Union acceded to on August 8, 1945, the Allies
reaffirmed that they coveted “no gain[s] for themselves and have no
thought of territorial expansion.”21 The Allies further agreed that Japan
would “be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or
occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all
the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese . . . shall be restored to . . .
China,” and that Japan will “be expelled from all other territories which she
has taken by violence and greed.”22 In 1945, the USSR agreed to enter the
war against Japan on the condition that, inter alia, “the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it” and “the Kurile Islands” would

18. Convention on Fundamental Principles for Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan-U.S.S.R., Jan. 20, 1925, Joint Compendium of
Documents, supra note 14.
19. Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Creation of the
South-Sakhalin Province in the Khabarovsk Region (1946), Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14.
20. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, Declaration of Principles issued by the President
of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14,
1941, 55 Stat. 1600, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
21. Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime
Minister Churchill in North Africa, Dec. 1, 1943, 9 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
393 (1943), https://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat91943unit_0#page/392/mode/
2up [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
22. Id.
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be returned to it at the conclusion of the war.23 The Potsdam Declaration,
which the Soviet Union acceded to on August 8, 1945, simply stated, in
part, that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out” and that
“Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as the Allies would determine.”24
The Potsdam Declaration further provided that Allied forces would withdraw from Japan as soon as “a peacefully inclined and responsible government” was established by “the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”25
In 1951, Japan renounced its right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands,
and to the part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it over which
Japan acquired sovereignty under Article 9 of the Treaty of Portsmouth. 26
The SFPT did not, however, determine the sovereignty of the islands renounced by Japan, leaving that question to “international solvents other
than this treaty.”27 Moreover, since the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty,
it conferred no rights upon the USSR.
As a result, Japan and the Soviet Union engaged in separate negotiations from June 1955 to October 1956 to conclude a peace treaty, but the
two sides were unable to reach an agreement because of the dispute over
the Northern Territories. Both sides agreed, however, to continue negotiations to conclude a treaty, which would address the territorial dispute after
diplomatic relations were reestablished between the two countries.28
23. Report Signed at Crimea (Yalta) Conference, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R, Feb. 11, 1945, 59
Stat. 1823, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp [hereinafter Yalta Agreement].
24. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender ¶ 8, July 26, 1945, 13 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 137 (July 29, 1945), https://archive.org/stream/depart
mentofstat131945unit#page/136/mode/2up [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration].
25. Id. ¶ 12.
26. SFPT, supra note 7, art. 2(c).
27. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Address at the San Francisco Peace Conference (Sept. 5, 1951), http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/
JPUS/19510905.S1E.html [hereinafter Dulles Address].
28. Letter from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Japanese Government, S.
Matsumoto, to the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko (1956),
Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“The Government of Japan is ready to
enter into negotiations in Moscow on the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations without the conclusion of a peace treaty at this time. . . . At the same time the Japanese Government thinks that after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations . . . , it is quite desirable that Japanese-Soviet relations develop even further on the basis of a formal peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue. . . . [T]he Japanese Government assumes
that negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue will
124
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The state of war between Japan and the USSR ended and JapaneseSoviet diplomatic relations were restored in 1956 with the signing of the
Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR.29 Paragraph nine provides that
the two countries would continue negotiations on the conclusion of a
peace treaty after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations, and
that the USSR would hand over Habomai and Shikotan Islands to Japan
after the peace treaty was concluded.30 However, the signing of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan31
prompted the USSR to walk away from its previous commitment to return
the islands, which would not occur until such time as all foreign troops
were withdrawn from Japan.32 Japanese objections that the Joint Declaration was an international agreement between the two nations and could not
be changed unilaterally by the Soviet Union fell on deaf ears.33
continue after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.”); Letter from the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko, to
the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Government of Japan, S. Matsumoto (1956),
Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“[T]he Soviet Government accepts the
view of the Japanese Government . . . and announces its agreement to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue,
after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations.”).
29. Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, USSRJapan, Oct. 19, 1956, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs
/19561019.D1E.html.
30. Id. ¶ 9 ( “Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations . . . negotiations for the conclusion of a
peace treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . agrees to hand over to Japan the
Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these
islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”).
31. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States
of America, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1633, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 33 U.N.T.S. 186
[hereinafter Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty].
32. Memorandum from the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan (1960),
Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“Japan’s conclusion of a new military
treaty [with the United States] . . . creates obstacles to the development of Soviet-Japanese
relations. . . . This situation makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to fulfill its
promises to return the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. . . . Thus, . . . the islands
of Habomai and Shikotan will be handed over to Japan, as was stated in the SovietJapanese Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956, only if all foreign troops are withdrawn
from Japan and a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty is signed.”).
33. Memorandum from the Japanese Government to the Soviet Government (1960),
Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“It is . . . incomprehensible that . . . the
Soviet Government is connecting the issue of the revised Japan-US Security Treaty with
125
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In October 1973, the territorial issue was revived during the JapaneseSoviet summit meeting in Moscow. A Joint Communiqué issued at the
conclusion of the summit recognized that the parties had “unresolved
problems left over since World War II” and that “the conclusion of a peace
treaty” would enhance relations between the two countries.34 Twenty years
later, the issue was still not resolved, but both sides agreed at a summit in
Tokyo in 1991 to continue to discuss and accelerate the work on the conclusion of a peace treaty, to include resolution of the territorial dispute.35
Following the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, Russia assumed responsibility for continuing the dialogue on these outstanding issues with the government of Japan. In a letter to the Russian people, President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that his government had inherited unresolved issues with Japan, including the conclusion of a peace treaty and
resolution of the Southern Kurile dispute.36 Russia’s commitment to rethe issue of handing over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. . . . The Joint Declaration
is an international agreement . . . which has been ratified by the highest organs of both
countries. . . . [T]he contents of this solemn international undertaking cannot be changed
unilaterally. Moreover, since the current [1951] Japan-U.S. Security Treaty . . . already existed and foreign troops were present in Japan when the Joint Declaration . . . was signed, .
. . it must be said the Declaration was signed on the basis of these facts. Consequently,
there is no reason that the agreements in the Joint Declaration should be affected in any
way. . . . Japan cannot approve of the Soviet attempt to attach new conditions for the provisions of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue. . . . Our country will keep insisting
on the reversion not only of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan but also of the other
islands which are inherent parts of Japanese territory.”).
34. Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué (Oct. 10, 1973), Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“Recognizing that the settlement of unresolved problems left over
from WWII and conclusion of a peace treaty would contribute to the establishment of
truly good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries. . . . Both sides
agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries at an appropriate time in 1974.”).
35. Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué (Apr. 18, 1991), Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“Prime Minister . . . Kaifu . . . and President . . . Gorbachev . . .
held . . . negotiations on a whole range of issues relating to the . . . conclusion of a peace
treaty . . . , including the issue of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the positions of both sides on the attribution of the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri,
and Etorofu.” The Prime Minister and the President also emphasized the “importance of
accelerating work to conclude the preparations for a peace treaty.”).
36. Letter from the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, to the Russian
People (1991), Joint Compendium of Documents, supra note 14 (“[A]n obvious obligation
of the new Russian leadership is to look for ways of resolving problems which we inherited from the policies of previous eras. . . . One of the problems we will have to resolve . . .
is reaching a final post-War settlement in our relations with Japan. . . . [T]he main obstacle
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solve these outstanding issues was reaffirmed two years later in the Tokyo
Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations,37 and again in 1998 in the Moscow
Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership between Japan and the
Russian Federation.38
Despite Russia’s stated intentions, a peace treaty has not been concluded and the dispute over the Northern Territories remains unresolved. In
Japan’s view, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu
have been under illegal occupation by the Soviet Union and then Russia
since 1945.39 The Soviet Union maintained that the 1945 Yalta Agreement
legally transferred sovereignty of the Kurile Islands, including the islands of
Etorofu, Habomai, Kunashiri and Shikotan, to the USSR at the conclusion
of the war.40 Russia argues that, as the successor State to the USSR, it holds
sovereignty over the disputed islands.
Japan counters that the Yalta Agreement was not a final determination
on the territorial issue, a position supported by the United States, which in
1956 stated “the United States regards the . . . Yalta agreement as simply a
statement of common purposes by the then heads of the participating
powers, and not as a final determination by those powers or of any legal

to the conclusion of this treaty is the issue of the demarcation of borders between Russia
and Japan. . . .”).
37. Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations, U.S.S.R.-Japan, Oct. 13, 1993,
http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19931013.D1E.html
(“The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation . . . have undertaken serious negotiations on the issue of where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the
Habomai Islands belong. They agree that negotiations towards an early conclusion of a
peace treaty . . . should continue.”).
38. Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership between Japan and
the Russian Federation, Nov. 13, 1998, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/
territory/edition01/moscow.html (“The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the
Russian Federation, taking into consideration . . . the proposal regarding a solution to the
issue of the attribution of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai made
by the Japanese side at the Summit Meeting in Kawana . . . , instruct their Governments to
accelerate negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration. . . . The two leaders reaffirm their resolve to make their utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000. . . .”).
39. Northern Territories, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/index.html.
40. Yalta Agreement, supra note 23.
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effect in transferring territories.”41 Moreover, since Japan was not a party to
the Agreement, it is not bound, legally or politically, by its provisions.42
Japan’s renunciation of its rights to the Kurile Islands in the 1951 SFPT
is also not determinative of the issue of sovereignty over the Northern Territories. During his speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference, U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, one of the principal architects of the
SFPT, confirmed that the treaty did not determine the sovereignty of the
islands renounced by Japan, but rather left that question to “international
solvents other than this treaty.”43 Japan additionally points out that, since
the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty, it conferred no rights upon the
USSR, a point reaffirmed by Japan each time senior Russian officials visit
the Northern Territories or Russian forces conduct maneuvers in the disputed islands.44
41. State Department Memorandum on the Japan-Soviet Negotiations, The AideMemoire (Sept. 7, 1956), http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JP
RU/19560907.O1E.html [hereinafter Aide-Memoire].
42. Id.
43. Dulles Address, supra note 27. See also Aide-Memoire, supra note 41.
44. On November 1, 2010, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned the
Russian Ambassador to Japan to express his regret and protest the visit to Kunashiri Island by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev: “President Medvedev's visit to Kunashiri
Island contradicts with Japan’s basic position. . . . It is extremely regrettable and Japan
lodges a protest.” In response, the Russian Ambassador stated that President Medvedev’s
visit was purely a domestic matter and that “the worsening of Russo-Japan relations is not
beneficial for both sides.” Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Minister for
Foreign Affairs Seiji Maehara Lodges Representations to Mr. Mikhail Bely, Russian Ambassador to Japan, Concerning the Visit to the Northern Territories by Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010
/11/1101_02.html. In May 2012, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its
regret over a construction project by a Korean company (Keumto Construction Co., Ltd.)
to build port infrastructure in Nayoka and Etorofu Islands in the Northern Territories:
Any act by an enterprise of a third country in the Northern Territories which can be interpreted as following the Russian jurisdiction . . . is not compatible with Japan’s position
concerning the Northern Territories. We express our strong regret over the activities of
this Korean enterprise, which run counter to the position of Japan.

Statement by the Press Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, on the Participation in the Infrastructure Building Work in the Northern Territories by an Enterprise of a
Third Country (May 30, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/
0530_02.html. On June 3, 2012, after Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to
Kunashiri Island the Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to the Russian Ambassador to Japan that “Kunashiri Island is the inherent territory of Japan. The Japanese
Government cannot accept this visit and finds it extremely regrettable. We express concern that this visit throws cold water on the positive atmosphere which has been con128

International Law Studies

2016

The ongoing dispute remains a major stumbling block in RussoJapanese bilateral relations. The most recent flare-up occurred in August
2015 after Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev and Russian Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Iturup Island. Japan protested the visit
as “‘incompatible with Japan’s stance’ on the dispute.”45 Russia responded
by calling the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s comments “unacceptable,” stating Japan’s claims to the islands were “baseless” and that Japan was
demonstrating “a dismissive attitude towards the results” of World War
II.46 During the visit, Prime Minister Medvedev announced that Russia had
decided to base a “modern effective military force” on the disputed islands
and that housing for the Russian force would be constructed on Etorofu
and Junishiri islands.47 The following month, four Japanese fighters were
scrambled to intercept a Russian aircraft that penetrated Japanese airspace

structed between Japan and Russia.” Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Summons Mr. Evgeny Vladimirovich Afanasiev, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Japan, on the Visit of Russian
Prime Minister Medvedev to the Northern Territories (July 3, 2012), http://www
.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012 /7/0703_02.html. In August 2014, over a thousand Russian troops, five attack helicopters and over a hundred vehicles conducted a series of military exercises on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands aimed at defending the islands.
Japan lodged a protest with Russia calling the exercise “totally unacceptable” and indicating that “the Northern Territories are an inherent part of Japan’s territory.” Russia responded that the exercise was not directed at Japan and that its protest was “groundless.”
U.S. Recognizes Japan’s Sovereignty over Russian-held Isles: Official, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/14/national/u-s-recognizes-japans-sovereig
nty-over-russian-held-isles-official/#.VfMzPXmFOUk.
45. Dmitry Filippov, The Northern Territories Remain the Stumbling Block in Russo–Japanese
Relations, EAST ASIA FORUM (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/04
/the-northern-territories-remain-the-stumbling-block-in-russo-japanese-relations/.
46. Id. See also Osamu Tsukimori, Denis Dyomkin & Jason Bush, Japan Protests Russian
PM's Visit to Disputed Island, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2015/08/22/us-russia-medvedev-japan-idUSKCN0QR04A20150822 (“[Russia’s] . . .
position is simple: We want to be friends with Japan, Japan is our neighbor. We have a
good attitude towards Japan, but this shouldn’t be linked in any way with the Kurile islands, which are part of the Russian Federation. Therefore we have made visits, we are
visiting and we will make visits to the Kuriles.”).
47. Maria Antonova, Russian PM Visits Disputed Kuril Islands, Triggering Japan Protest,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 22, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/japan-protests-russian-pm-visitsdisputed-kuril-islands-053050767.html. See also Japan Premier Hits Out at Russian PM’s Visit
to Disputed Islands, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 23, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/japan-premierhits-russian-pms-visit-disputed-islands-055614051.html.
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off Hokkaido. A protest was immediately lodged with the Russian embassy
in Tokyo.48
Despite the recent dust up, both sides agreed to meet in Moscow at the
end of September 2015 to discuss bilateral relations, including the disputed
islands and conclusion of a peace treaty.49 Any hope of resolving the territorial disputes at the meeting was dashed, however, when Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov indicated to his counterpart Fumio Kishida that
there was no room for compromise over the Southern Kurile Islands. 50
Notwithstanding Minister Lavrov’s statement, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the margins of
the U.N. General Assembly meeting in late September to discuss the issue.51
Since 1956, the United States’ position has been that, “after careful examination of the historical facts . . . , the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri
(along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be
acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.”52 That position was reaffirmed in 2014 by a U.S. Department of State spokesperson.53 Of U.S. concern is that an armed attack against Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) units
in the area by Russian forces could trigger U.S. defense obligations under
48. Japan Protests after “Russian” Plane Enters Airspace, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://news.yahoo.com/japan-scrambles-jets-intercept-russian-plane-222619504.html.
49. Japanese Foreign Minister to Discuss Disputed Isles in Moscow, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/19/us-russia-japan-idUSKCN0RJ04R2015091
9; Russia and Japan to Continue Discussions on Peace Treaty, KSL.COM (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.ksl.com/?nid=235&sid=36625923&title=russia-and-japan-to-continuediscussions-on-peace-treaty.
50. Japan Must Recognise Kuril Islands for Peace Deal: Lavrov, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 21,
2015), http://news.yahoo.com/japan-must-recognise-kuril-islands-peace-deal-lavrov-2002
16317.html (“Neither the ‘northern territories’ of Japan nor the ‘northern territories’ of
Russia are the subject of our dialogue. On our agenda is reaching the peace deal. Moving
forward on this issue is possible only after we see clearly Japan’s recognition of historic
realities. The work is difficult and the difference in positions is vast.”).
51. Hyun Oh, Residents of Russian-held Isles Disputed by Japan Await Diplomatic Resolution,
REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/25/us-japan-russiaidUSKCN0RP1FZ20150925.
52. Aide-Memoire, supra note 41.
53. Daily Press Briefing, Marie Harf, Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State
(Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/08/230586.htm#JA PAN
(“The United States recognizes Japanese sovereignty over these islands [the Southern Kurile Islands].”).
130

International Law Studies

2016

Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.54
III.

LIANCOURT ROCKS (TAKESHIMA/DOKDO)
(JAPAN V. SOUTH KOREA)

The Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima (Japan)/Dokdo (South Korea)) are
claimed by both Japan and South Korea, but have been occupied by South
Korea since 1954. Japan bases its claim primarily on historical documents
and incorporation of Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture in 1905.55 Japan
additionally asserts that the negotiating history of the SFPT,56 as well as a
54. Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, supra note 31, art. 5 (“Each Party recognizes
that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”).
55. In 1905, the Japanese government incorporated Takeshima into the Shimane Prefecture, identifying the islets by their geographic coordinates. Incorporation of Takeshima
into Shimane Prefecture, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (July 30, 2015). The
location of the “uninhabited island” was specified as “latitude 379’30” N, longitude
13155” E . . . located at 85 sea-miles northwest of Oki Island.” Tsukamoto Takashi, The
Meaning of the Territorial Incorporation of Takeshima (1905), Review of Island Studies, Center
for Island Studies, Dec 25, 2014, http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/research/a00014/.
The cabinet decision was published in Japanese newspapers in February 1905 and the
governor of Shimane Prefecture registered the islands in the state land register. Lack of
extensive publication of Takeshima’s incorporation can be explained by the fact that Japan
was still at war with Russia and was planning to use the islets as a communications and
surveillance facility. It is understandable from an operational security standpoint that Japan
did not widely advertise the incorporation of the islets. Had it done so, Japan would have
alerted Russia that Japanese forces were on the island, making those forces vulnerable to
attack by the Russian fleet in Vladivostok. Japanese sovereignty over Takeshima went uncontested for the next forty years.
56. During the negotiations of the 1951 treaty, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, informed the South Korean Ambassador to the United
States that the Liancourt Rocks were “normally uninhabited,” had never been “treated as
part of Korea” and since 1905 had “been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch
Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan.” The Rusk note went on to say that “the island
does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.” Diplomatic Note of 10 August 1951 from the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk,
to the South Korean Ambassador to the United States, You Chan Yang,
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Rusk_note_of_1951 [hereinafter Rusk Diplomatic Note].
See also Mark S. Lovmo, The United States’ Involvement with Dokdo Island (Liancourt Rocks): A
Timeline of the Occupation and Korean War Era, DOKDO RESEARCH (2004), http://dokdoresearch.com/page9.html. The U.S. position was confirmed in July 1951 by the State De131
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number of post-war documents, support its position that Japan retained
sovereignty over the islets after World War II. South Korea’s claim is likewise based primarily on historical records and its purported presence and
administration of Dokdo, excluding the forty-year period of Japanese military occupation between 1905 and 1945. It relies heavily on a 1900 Imperial
Ordnance that asserted sovereignty over Utsuryo Island (present day
Ulleungdo), which South Korea contends included Dokdo.57 South Korea
additionally argues that the Cairo Declaration,58 Yalta Agreement, Potsdam
Declaration59 and the SFPT, as well as instructions issued by General MacArthur as the SCAP, all support its position that Japan returned Dokdo to
Korea at the conclusion of the war.60 Based on evidence presented by the
claimants and standards concerning island disputes articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases like Indonesia v. Malaysia61 and Malay-

partment geographer, S.W. Boggs, in a note to the Special Assistant to the Director of the
Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Robert A. Fearey, which stated that “while there is a
Korean name for Dagelet [Ulleungdo], none exists for the Liancourt Rocks and they are
not shown in maps made in Korea.” Id.
57. Dokdo Development and Imperial Ordinance No. 41 of the Korean Empire, NORTHEAST
ASIAN HISTORY NETWORK, http://contents.nahf.or.kr/english/item/level.do?levelId
=eddok_003e_0030_0010 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). See also The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute,
KOREA.NET, http://www.korea.net/News/news/newsprint.asp?serial_no=20091228010
(last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
58. But the Cairo Declaration only required Japan to return the Pacific islands it had
seized since 1914 (Takeshima was incorporated into Japan in 1905) and determined that
Korea would become a free and independent State following the war. Cairo Declaration,
supra note 21.
59. The Potsdam Declaration simply reaffirms the terms of the Cairo Declaration and
limited Japanese sovereignty “to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and
such minor islands as we determine.” Potsdam Declaration, supra note 24, ¶ 8.
60. Notwithstanding South Korea’s position, Dokdo is not mentioned in the Cairo
Declaration, Potsdam Declaration or Yalta Agreement. Similarly, the 1951 SFPT does not
mention the status of Dokdo despite a concerted effort by the Korean government to
include Dokdo in the list of islands that Japan renounced title to in favor of Korea in Article 2(a) of the Treaty. Diplomatic Note of 19 July 1951 from the Korean Ambassador to
the Secretary of State, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_from_You_Chan_Yang_to_
Dean_Acheson,_19_July,_1951. Article 2(a) of the SFPT provides that Japan would recognize the “independence of Korea” and would renounce “all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart [Cheju], Port Hamilton and Dagelet [Ulleungdo].”
61. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J.
625, 683 (Dec. 17).
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sia v. Singapore,62 it would appear that Japan has the superior claim to the
islets.63
The island dispute has also resulted in a maritime boundary dispute between the claimants. South Korea asserts that the EEZ median line should
be between Ulleungdo and Japan’s Oki Island. Japan, on the other hand,
maintains that the median line should be between Takeshima and
Ulleungdo. Both sides have made some concessions in the context of joint
development and allocation of fisheries resources in the vicinity of the islands.64 A 1965 fisheries agreement, which was replaced in 1999 by a new
agreement, established a joint fisheries control zone without mentioning
the ongoing territorial dispute over the islets.65 Similarly, a 1977 agreement
established a Joint Development Zone, most of which lies on the Japanese
side of a hypothetical equidistant line, which allows for exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf by both countries.66
Notwithstanding this limited progress, repeated efforts by Japan since
1954 to refer the dispute to the ICJ or other third-party intervention for
adjudication have been consistently ejected by South Korea.67 In South Korea’s view, the dispute is not a legal issue that can be resolved by the ICJ,
but rather a historical matter associated with Japan’s invasion of Korea. 68
Bilateral discussions to resolve the long-standing territorial and maritime
62. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay./Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 14 (May 23).
63. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Sovereignty Claims over the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima),
28 CHINESE (TAIWAN) YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AFFAIRS 78 (2010).
64. Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration, A New Japan-Republic of Korea
Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century (Oct. 8, 1998), http://www.mofa.go.jp
/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.
65. Japan unilaterally withdrew from the 1965 Agreement in 1998 after it declared its
exclusive economic zone in June 1996. Kunwoo Kim, Korea-Japan Fish Dispute, INVENTORY OF CONFLICT AND ENVIRONMENT (ICE) (Apr. 23, 2002), http://www1.ameri
can.edu/ted/ice/korea-japan-islands.htm.
66. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO. 75, CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA 4 (1977), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/59588.pdf.
67. An Outline of the Japanese Position on Sovereignty over Takeshima and the Illegal Occupation
by the Republic of Korea, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (July 30, 2015),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html.
68. Dokdo & East Sea: Wrapping-up Review of Each Issue, KOREA.NET (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://m.korea.net/english/Government/Current-Affairs/Others/view?affairId=83&sub
Id=233&articleId=1031.
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boundary disputes have been ongoing since the 1950s, with no resolution
in sight.
As a result, relations between the two U.S. allies remain strained, and
Japan has repeatedly called on South Korea to return the disputed islets.
The most recent exchanges occurred in early 2015.69 Notwithstanding the
recent row, on April 14, 2015, the two countries held their first high-level
meeting—2+2 talks involving senior officials from the ministries of foreign
affairs and defense—in more than five years to discuss territorial and historical differences.70 Additionally, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President
Park Geun-hye met in Seoul for the first time since taking office in 2012
and 2013, respectively.71
Historically, the United States viewed the Liancourt Rocks as sovereign
Japanese territory.72 The U.S. position changed, however, to one of “neutrality” shortly after the Korean War ended.73 Since 1953, the United States
69. The Shimane prefectural government held its annual convention on February
22—Takeshima Day. The Parliamentary Vice Minister in the Cabinet Office, Yohei
Matsumoto, attended the ceremony, reiterating Japan’s position that Takeshima is sovereign Japanese territory and stating the Japan “was working to achieve a peaceful resolution
of the problem.” South Korean officials called the Japanese claim “ludicrous.” Japan Calls
for Return of Isles from South Korea, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 22, 2015), http://news.yahoo.
com/japan-calls-return-isles-south-korea-085002588.html. Two months later, South Korea condemned the Japanese government for approving new textbooks that reflect that
Takeshima is part of Japan, issuing a strongly worded protest that indicated that the Education Ministry’s approval of the new geography books was “yet another provocation that
distorts, reduces, and omits clear historic facts to strengthen its unjust claims to what is
clearly our territory. The Japanese government is in effect saying it will repeat its mistakes
of the past.” Japanese Education Minister Hakubun Shimomura responded stating that
“It’s only natural that we want to teach children correctly about their country’s territory.”
Jack Kim, South Korea Condemns Japanese Books as Bid to Repeat ‘Past Mistakes,’ REUTERS (Apr.
6, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/06/us-southkorea-japan-idUSKBN0
MX0F720150406.
70. South Korea, Japan Hold First Security Talks for 5 Years, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 14,
2015), http://news.yahoo.com/south-korea-japan-hold-first-security-talks-5-072152405.ht
ml.
71. Justin McCurry, Japan and South Korea Summit Signals Thaw in Relations, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/02/japansouth-korea-summit-thaw-in-relations.
72. Rusk Diplomatic Note, supra note 56.
73. An internal State Department memo suggested that the best way forward for the
United States would be “to extricate itself from the dispute to the greatest extent possible”
and suggest to the parties that “the matter might appropriately be referred to the International Court of Justice,” noting that the United States had treaty obligations to both claimants and that the “United States would be placed in the embarrassing position . . . of seem134
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has maintained its neutrality on the sovereignty issue, while calling on both
sides to resolve their differences peacefully, either bilaterally or through
third-party intervention. The U.S. position was reaffirmed by a State Department spokesperson in 2014—“Nothing has changed about our policy
on the Liancourt Rocks. We don’t take a position on the sovereignty of
those islands.”74 The U.S. position is understandable given the fact that the
United States has treaty obligations to both of the disputants and is concerned that the ongoing rift over the islets could hinder U.S. efforts to create a united front against Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas.

ing to choose between Japan or Korea.” Letter from Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State to E. Allan Lightner, American
Embassy, Korea, Possible Methods of Resolving Liancourt Rocks Dispute Between Japan
and the Republic of Korea (July 22, 1953), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Possible
_Methods_of_Resolving_Liancourt_Rocks_Dispute_between_Japan_and_ROK. A subsequent State Department memorandum dated November 11, 1953, similarly indicated
that the United States should remind Korea of the Rusk note; “express strong hope that
settlement can be reached with the Japanese; . . . [note that] the United States seeks to
avoid any form of intervention in this matter;” if clashes continue to occur the United
States “may be forced to give publicity to the Rusk letter and to reiterate the view expressed therein”; and if Korea cannot accept the views expressed in the Rusk letter, it
should “take steps toward arbitration or appeal the matter to the ICJ.” Memorandum by
William T. Turner in Regard to the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima Island) Controversy
(Nov. 30, 1953), https://sites.google.com/site/liancourttakeshima/Home/-recon firmation-liacnorut-rocks-is-terrotory-of-japan-by-san-fransisco-treaty-of-peace. The following
month, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles again suggested that the parties refer the
dispute to the ICJ for adjudication. Telegram from John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of
State, to American Embassy, Japan (Dec. 9, 1953), http://dokdo-or-takeshima.blogsp
ot.com/2008/08/1953-december-secret-security.html. See also Lovmo, supra note 56. Similarly, a report submitted by Ambassador James Van Fleet after a trip to the Asia-Pacific
region in August 1954 stated that the United States had informed South Korea that the
Liancourt Rocks “remained under Japanese sovereignty and the Island was not included
among the Islands that Japan released from its ownership under the Peace Treaty.” The
report additionally stated, however, that the United States has not “interfere[d] in the dispute.” As a possible way forward, Ambassador Van Fleet informally recommended to
South Korean officials that “that the dispute might properly be referred to the International Court of Justice.” Ownership of Dokto Island, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/pdfs/g_sfjoyaku04.pdf (last visited
Jan. 16, 2016).
74. Daily Press Briefing, Marie Harf, Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/221643.htm#SOUTHK
OREA.
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PINNACLE ISLANDS (DIAOYU/SENKAKUS) (CHINA/JAPAN)

The Pinnacle Islands are comprised of five uninhabited islands75 and three
barren rocks.76 The island group is located approximately 120 nm Northeast of Taiwan, 200 nm east of mainland China and 190 nm southwest of
Okinawa. The islands, which are claimed by China, Taiwan and Japan, are
separated from the Ryukus Islands by the 2,270-meter-deep Okinawa
Trough.
Historically, the Pinnacle Islands had little intrinsic value. However, the
dispute over the islands intensified in 1969 after the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released a report
suggesting that the seabed around the islands could contain rich oil and gas
reserves.77 Although no oil and gas has been produced from the Pinnacle
Islands continental shelf to date,78 an analysis brief published by the U.S.
Energy Information Administration in September 2014 estimates “that the
East China Sea has about 200 million barrels of oil in proven and probable
reserves” and “between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet in proven and probable
natural gas reserves.”79

75. Uotsurishima/Diaoyu Dao; Taisho-to/Chiwei Yu; Kubashima/Huangwei Yu;
Kita-Kojima/Bei Xiaodao; and Minami-Kojima/Nan Xiaodao.
76. Oki-no-Kita-iwa/Da Bei Xiaodao; Oki-no-Minami-iwa/Da Nan Xiaodao; and
Tobise/Fei Jiao Yan.
77. Daniel Dzurek, Comments on “Island Disputes in East Asia,” in SECURITY FLASHPOINTS: OIL, ISLANDS, SEA ACCESS AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION 419 (Myron H.
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1998); Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s
Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands, 29 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 903, 917 (2008). The ECAFE report indicated that a “high probability
exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.” K. O. EMERY ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
AND SOME WATER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EAST CHINA SEA AND THE YELLOW SEA 41
(1969), https://www.gsj.jp/data/ccop-bull/2-01.pdf [hereinafter ECAFE REPORT].
78. Therefore, “the question as to whether there is recoverable crude oil in commercially exploitable quantities remains unanswered.” DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE: OIL UNDER
TROUBLED WATERS? 25 (1971) [hereinafter CIA SENKAKU ISLANDS INTELLIGENCE REPORT].
79. East China Sea Report, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION 2–3 (Sept.
17, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/regions_of_interest
/East_China_Sea/east_china_sea.pdf. “Chinese sources claim that undiscovered resources can run as high as 70 to 160 billion barrels of oil for the entire East China Sea”
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The Pinnacle Islands are strategically located along some of the AsiaPacific’s most important sea lines of communication in the East China Sea.
Additionally, the waters surrounding the islands are home to productive
fisheries, which have been traditionally exploited by Chinese, Taiwanese
and Japanese fishermen.80
The Japanese government incorporated some of the islands in 1895,
and Japan has exercised effective administration and control over the islands, except for the period between 1951 and 1972 when the islands were
under U.S. administration pursuant to the SFPT.81 In 1896, four of the islands were leased by the Japanese government to a Japanese national free
of charge.82 The four remaining islands were sold by the government to a
Japanese citizen in 1932.83
The United States transferred administrative control of the Pinnacle Islands back to Japan in 1972 pursuant to the Okinawa reversion treaty.84
Since then, Kubashima/Huangwei and Taisho-to/Chiwei Yu have been
provided to the U.S. military as facilities and areas under the Japan-U.S.
Status of Forces Agreement.85 Both China and Taiwan protested the transfer.
and “as much as 250 trillion cubic feet in undiscovered gas resources, mostly in the Xihu/Okinawa trough.” Id.
80. Ji Guoxing, Maritime Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas: Options for Equitable Settlement
11 (Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper No. 19 (1995)).
81. Article 3 provides that
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and
the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a
proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise
all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

SFPT, supra note 7, art. 3.
82. Uotsurishima/Diaoyu Dao; Kubashima/Huangwei Yu; Kita-Kojima/Bei
Xiaodao; and Minami-Kojima/Nan Xiaodao.
83. The government had retained ownership of Taisho-to/Chiwei Yu, Oki-no-Kitaiwa/Da Bei Xiaodao, Oki-no-Minami-iwa/Da Nan Xiaodao and Tobise/Fei Jiao Yan.
84. Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 446 (1971).
85. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the
Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652; T.I.A.S.
No. 4510; 373 U.N.T.S. 248.
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In 1978, the Japan Youth Association (JYA) erected a lighthouse on
Uotsurishima as a demonstration of Japanese sovereignty over the islands.86
China responded by sending a large flotilla of fishing boats to the islands. 87
The dispute simmered for the next twenty-plus years until the mid-1990s,
when members of the JYA returned to Uotsurishima to construct a new
lighthouse on the islet.88 Taiwan and China both strongly protested the action.89 Additionally, as in previous instances, a flotilla of Chinese protest
boats was dispatched to the islands. The Japanese Coast Guard intercepted
the flotilla, but one Chinese activist drowned when he tried to swim to one
of the islets.90 On October 7, 1996, a handful of Chinese protesters successfully landed, albeit briefly, on Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island and raised the
Chinese and Taiwanese flags. The flags were removed by the Japanese
Coast Guard and diplomatic protests were lodged with the two countries.91
Over the next several years, both sides continued to take provocative actions that exacerbated the dispute.92 Then in 2002, the private landowners

86. Zhongqi Pan, Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective, 12 JOURNAL OF CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE 71, 74
(2007).
87. Id. In 2005, the Japanese government announced that it had placed the lighthouse
under State control and protection. Id. at 76.
88. Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute (Oct. 18, 1996) (on file with
author), https://mulrickillion.wordpress.com/2009/03/01/the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dis
pute/. See also KERRY DUMBAUGH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31183, CHINA’S
MARITIME TERRITORIAL CLAIMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 19 (2001); Hungdah
Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto) 22 (Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 1, University of Maryland School of Law, 1999); Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 77, at 921; Pan, supra note 86, at
75.
89. Chinese protests were made on September 10, 1996, by the Director of Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry; on September 11, 1996, by its ambassador to Japan; and on
March 30, 1997, by the China’s Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. Chiu, supra note 88, at
22–23. See also Pan, supra note 86, at 74.
90. Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 77, at 920; Pan, supra note 86, at 75.
91. Chiu, supra note 88, at 22–23. See also Pan, supra note 86, at 75.
92. In 1997, for example, a Japanese legislator landed on the one of the islets. The
landing was denounced by China as a “serious violation of China’s . . . sovereignty.” The
following year, Chinese protesters landed on Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island after their vessel, the
Baodiao Hao, sank after clashing with the Japanese Coast Guard. Several years later, in
2000, Japanese activists landed on Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island and contructed a shrine. China
condemned the action, demanding that Japan prevent similar incidents from recurring.
Pan, supra note 86, at 75.
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of Uotsurishima, Kita-Kojima and Minami-Kojima leased the islands to the
Japanese government.
Sino-Japanese relations suffered a serious setback in September 2010
after a Chinese fishing trawler intentionally rammed two Japanese Coast
Guard vessels that were attempting to detain the ship for illegally fishing in
the vicinity of the Pinnacle Islands. Following a series of high-level demands by China and threats of strong countermeasures if the captain was
not unconditionally released, Japan ultimately succumbed and freed him.93
Since then, China’s presence and aggressive behavior in the disputed
area have been on the upswing. Some examples of Chinese provocative
and potentially dangerous behavior include buzzing of Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) warships,94 locking fire control radar on JMSDF

93. The captain was charged with deliberately colliding with the Coast Guard vessels
and obstructing public officers in the performance of their duties. Following his arrest,
China suspended ministerial-level contacts with Japan and threatened to withdraw from
previously scheduled discussions on the East China Sea gas fields. In addition, public
demonstrations were orchestrated outside Japanese diplomatic missions in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Shenyang, and four Japanese nationals were detained for allegedly videotaping activities at a military base in Hebei Province. Finally, China imposed an embargo
on the shipment of rare earth metals to Japan. Demands by China for an apology and
compensation for the incident were rejected by Japan. Martin Fackler, Japan Retreats with
Release of Chinese Boat Captain, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.html. The captain was subsequently
indicted in abstentia by a Japanese judicial panel in July 2011. Chinese officials condemned
the verdict, calling it an unlawful and invalid judicial procedure. China Rejects Japanese Judicial Panel's Verdict to Indict Fishing Vessel Captain, JAGRAN POST (July 23, 2011),
http://post.jagran.com/China-rejects-Japanese-judicial-panels-verdict-to-indict-fishingvessel-captain-1311431603.
94. In April 2010, People’s Liberation Army–Navy (PLA(N)) helicopters buzzed two
Japanese warships—JDS Asayuki (DD 132) and JDS Suzunami (DDG 114)—that were
shadowing a large Chinese task group off the coast of Okinawa. The helicopters dangerously approached to within ninety meters horizontally and fifty meters vertically of the
JMSDF ships. Similarly, in March 2011, a State Oceanic Administration helicopter buzzed
the JDS Samidare (DD 106) near the disputed East China Sea gas fields, approaching to
within seventy meters of the Japanese destroyer. Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs & Justin
Jones, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia, LOWY INSTITUTE (June 2011), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Medcalf_and_Hein
richs%2C_Crisis_and_confidence-revised.pdf; JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE
OF JAPAN 2015 pt. 1, ch. 3, sec. 3, at 36 (2015), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/
w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_1-1-3_web.pdf [hereinafter WHITE PAPER PT. I, CH. 1,
SEC. 3].
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ships and aircraft,95 and dangerous intercepts of Japanese surveillance aircraft.96
Relations between Japan and China hit a new low in September 2012
when the press reported that the Japanese government had agreed to buy
three of the five disputed islands (Uotsurishima, Kita-Kojima and MinamiKojima) from the Kurihara family for ¥2.05 billion (US$26.2 million).97
The deal was approved by the Cabinet on September 10, 2012.98 The pur95. On January 19, 2013, a PLA(N) Jiangwei-I class frigate illuminated a JMSDF helicopter with its fire control radar. Ten days later a PLA(N) Jiangwei-II class missile frigate
locked its fire control radar on the JDS Yudachi (DD 103), which was operating in the East
China Sea. Japan protested both incidents, indicating that “projecting fire control radar is
very unusual; one mistake, and the situation would become very dangerous.” Linda Sieg &
Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan Protests to China after Radar Pointed at Vessel, REUTERS (Feb. 6,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-china-japan-idUSBRE91410Q20
130205. See also WHITE PAPER PT. I, CH. 1, SEC. 3, supra note 94, at 36; JAPAN MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2015 pt. 1, ch. 2, sec. 3, at 118 (2015),
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_1-2-3_web.pdf [hereinafter WHITE PAPER PT. I, CH. 2, SEC. 3]. The United States also expressed concern over the
fire control radar incident, stating that “we have seen and are concerned by the reports of
the Chinese radar incident” and encouraged both sides to avoid steps “that raise tensions
and increase the risk of miscalculations that could undermine peace and stability in the
region.” Yuka Hayashi, Jeremy Page & Julian E. Barnes, Tensions Flare as Japan Says China
Threatened Its Forces, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424127887324445904578285442601856314.
96. On two separate occasions in May and June 2014, Chinese Su-27 fighters conducted dangerous intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance aircraft operating in international
airspace over the East China Sea, coming within two hundred feet of the Japanese aircraft.
WHITE PAPER PT. I, CH. 1, SEC. 3, supra note 94, at 36; WHITE PAPER PT. I, CH. 2, SEC. 3,
supra note 95, at 118; Adam Liff & Andrew Erickson, Crowding the Waters: The Need for Crisis
Management in the East China Sea, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2015-03-23/crowding-waters.
97. Chico Harlan, Reports: Japan Agrees to Buy Disputed Islands from Private Landowner,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/reportsjapan-agrees-to-buy-disputed-islands-from-private-landowner/2012/09/05/c8c7bc46f73c-11e1-8398-0327ab83ab91_story.html; Masami Ito & Mizuho Aoki, Government Seen
Sealing Senkaku Deal at ¥2.05 Billing, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://info.japan
times.co.jp/text/nn20120906a1.html.
98. According to Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, the Japanese government
decided to purchase the islands “to keep them under peaceful control” after the private
owners put the islands on the market. The other potential buyer, the Tokyo metropolitan
government, led by the ultra-nationalist Governor Shintaro Ishihara, had indicated that it
intended to station JSDF forces on the disputed islands and construct harbors for use by
Japanese fishing boats. The Japanese government believed that development of the islands
would inflame Chinese nationalism and therefore decided to purchase the islands to pre140
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chase was ostensibly made to prevent Governor Shintaro Ishihara, then
nationalist governor of Tokyo, from buying the islands. Earlier in the year
he had expressed an interest in purchasing and developing the islands, a
move that would certainly have inflamed tensions with China.99 Despite
Japan’s professed good intentions in averting the purchase by Governor
Ishihara, the sale of the islands to the Japanese government prompted diplomatic protests from China and Taiwan, as well as widespread antiJapanese demonstrations across China.100 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the purchase, indicating that any unilateral actions taken
by the Japanese regarding the Pinnacle Islands are “illegal and invalid.”101 It
also deployed two Chinese marine surveillance ships to the islands as a
show of force.102
Several weeks after the purchase was announced, China deposited a
chart with the United Nations showing the baselines and outer limits of the
territorial sea of China, as well as a list of geographical coordinates of
points defining the baselines of China around the Pinnacle Islands.103 Japan
protested the Chinese submission on September 24, 2012.104 Six months
vent Japanese nationalists from gaining control of the islands. Takashi Mochizuki, Japan
Plans to Buy Islands in Dispute, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443921504577643261139002438.
99. Jane Perlez, China Accuses Japan of Stealing after Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands,
NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/wor
ld/asia/china-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-islands.html. See also Position Paper: JapanChina Relations Surrounding the Situation of the Senkaku Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/p osition_paper_en.html.
100. MARK E. MANYIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42761, SENKAKU (DIAOUYU/DIAOYUTAI) ISLANDS DISPUTE: U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS 1 (2012).
101. Mure Dickie & Kathrin Hille, Japan Risks China’s Wrath over Senkakua, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/babbfa2a-fb2b-11e1-87ae00144feabdc0.html. The People’s Liberation Army Daily likewise labeled the purchase “the
most blatant challenge to China’s sovereignty since the end of World War II.” Quoted in
China Sends Patrol Ships to Island Held by Japan, CSNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/china-sends-patrol-ships-islands-held-japan.
102. Perlez, supra note 99.
103. U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs,
Maritime Zone Notifications (Sept. 21, 2012),, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGIS
LATIONANDTREATIES/PDF FILES/mzn_s/mzn89ef.pdf.
104. Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Note Verbale PM/12/303
(Sept. 24, 2012), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 80, at 39
(2013), http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/ bu
lletin80e.pdf.
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later, in April 2013, China elevated the status of the island dispute as a
“core interest,” signaling to Japan that it is not willing to make any concessions on the sovereignty dispute.105
The dispute was further exacerbated in November 2013 when China
unexpectedly established an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over
much of the East China Sea.106 All aircraft entering the zone must comply
with the aircraft identification rules and provide flight information to Chinese air traffic controllers.107 Additionally, aircraft operating in the ADIZ
are required to follow the instructions of the Chinese Ministry of Defense
or suffer “defensive emergency measures.”108
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately protested China’s declaration, emphasizing (inter alia) that the ADIZ was “totally unacceptable . . . [and] was extremely dangerous as it could unilaterally escalate
the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands and lead to an unexpected
occurrence of accidents in the airspace.”109 The following week, JSDF air105. China’s other “core interests” include Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjing and the South China Sea. China Officially Labels Senkakus a “Core Interest,” JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labelssenkakus-a-core-interest/.
106. On November 23, 2013, China declared an ADIZ over a large portion of the
East China Sea that overlaps portions of the South Korean and Japanese ADIZs, which
have been in existence since 1951. The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed
by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six points: 33º11’N (North
Latitude) and 121º47’E (East Longitude), 33º11’N and 125º00’E, 31º00’N and 128º20’E,
25º38’N and 125º00’E, 24º45’N and 123º00’E, 26º44’N and 120º58’E. Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification
Zone, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm. The new ADIZ was purportedly established to protect
China’s sovereignty and territorial and airspace security, as well as maintain flying order.
China Exclusive: Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm.
107. Aircraft will provide the following information: (1) flight plan identification, (2)
radio identification, (3) transponder identification and (4) logo identification. Announcement
of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the
P.R.C., XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm.
108. Id.
109. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, China’s Establishment of an
Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea (Protest by Mr. Junichi Ihara, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, MOFA, to Mr. Han Zhingiang,
Minister of the Chinese Embassy in Japan) (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/
press/release/press4e_000100.html. The following day Japanese Minister of Foreign Af142
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craft operationally challenged the ADIZ by conducting an unannounced
reconnaissance mission in the zone near the Pinnacle Islands. 110 Japan also
instructed Japanese civil aircraft to disregard the new ADIZ procedures, to
include the requirement to file flight plans with the relevant Chinese authorities.111 As implemented by China, most nations would agree that the
East China Sea ADIZ interferes with high seas freedoms of overflight and
is therefore inconsistent with international law.112
Since 2013, Chinese intrusions into Japan’s claimed airspace and waters
around the islands have become commonplace in an apparent effort to
demonstrate that Japan does not exercise effective administrative control
of the islands. These increased incursions raise the possibility of a miscalcu-

fairs, Fumio Kishida, stated (inter alia) that Japan would “respond firmly, but in a calm
manner against China’s attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo by coercive measures
with determination to defend resolutely its territorial land, sea and airspace.” Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
on the Announcement on the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by the
Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (Nov. 24, 2013),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000098.html. The United States also expressed its concern that the ADIZ declaration will “increase tensions in the region and
create risks of an incident.” Press Statement, John Kerry, Secretary of State, Statement on
the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm. See also Press Statement,
Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?rel
easeid=16392 (“The United States . . . views this development as a destabilizing attempt to
alter the status quo in the region. The unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.”).
110. Japanese and South Korean Aircraft Enter Chinese ADIZ, WANT CHINA TIMES (Nov.
29, 2013), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131129000064
&cid=1101.
111. Thom Shanker, U.S. Sends Two B-52 Bombers into Air Zone Claimed by China, NEW
YORK TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/world/asia/us-fli
es-b-52s-into-chinas-expanded-air-defense-zone.html?_r=0; Julian Barnes, Yuka Hayashi
& Jeremy Page, Stakes Escalate For Biden in Beijing, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304579404579236652947844062.
112. Jonathan Odom, A ‘Rules-Based’ Approach to Airspace Defense: A U.S. Perspective on
the International Law of the Sea and Airspace, Air Defense Measures, and the Freedom of Navigation,
1 BELGIUM REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–93 (2014). See also Raul (Pete) Pedrozo,
The Bull in the China Shop: Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 66, 68–77 (2014).
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lation or other unintended consequence.113 In the three-month period between July 1 and September 30, 2015, JSDF fighters have been scrambled
117 times to intercept Chinese aircraft in the vicinity of the Senkakus.114
China argues that the Japanese intercepts hamper its freedom of overflight
and threaten the safety of its ships and aircraft.115 In an apparent show of
force, eleven Chinese military aircraft—eight bombers, two surveillance
planes and an early-warning aircraft—conducted a drill near Miyako and
Okinawa in November 2015 “to improve its long-range combat abilities,”
prompting the JSDF to scramble jets to intercept and monitor the aircraft.116
On the economic front, China also appears to be extracting gas from
disputed gas fields near the hypothetical median line with Japan in the East
China Sea, despite a 2008 agreement not to engage in individual drilling
pending resolution of the maritime boundary dispute. Photographs published in Japan’s 2015 defense White Paper confirm the construction of
sixteen structures that are currently engaged in offshore drilling operations
in the East China Sea.117 On September 16, 2015, Japan protested the activity, indicating that “it is extremely regrettable that the Chinese side . . . has
unilaterally gone ahead with the development while the border has not yet
been settled.”118 Six weeks later, China agreed to restart talks on the con-

113. In FY2014, JSDF force aircraft were scrambled 464 times to intercept Chinese
aircraft intruding into Japan’s claimed airspace around the Pinnacle Islands. WHITE PAPER
PT. I, CH. 1, SEC. 3, supra note 94, at 44.
114. Ben Blanchard, China Calls on Japan to Stop “Hampering” Military Flights, REUTERS
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/29/us-china-japan-idUSKCN
0SN0W020151029.
115. Id.
116. “Large” Chinese Military Fleet Flies Near Japan Islands: Media, YAHOO! NEWS (Nov.
27, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/large-chinese-military-fleet-flies-near-japan-islands035354583.html.
117. Jeffrey W. Hornung, Get Ready: China-Japan Tensions Set to Flare over East China Sea,
THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Aug. 12, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/get-readychina-japan-tensions-set-flare-over-east-china-sea-13557?page=show; Felix K. Chang,
China’s Energy Exploration In East China Sea And Japan’s Security Debate – Analysis, EURASIA
REVIEW (July 30, 2015), http://www.eurasiareview.com/30072015-chinas-energy-ex ploration-in-east-china-sea-and-japans-security-debate-analysis/.
118. Japan Protests Chinese Gas Operation in Disputed Sea, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://news.yahoo.com/japan-protests-chinese-gas-operation-disputed-sea-114447459.ht
ml.
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tentious issue during the South Korea-China-Japan trilateral summit in
Seoul.119
To counter Chinese activities in the region, Japan’s defense ministry
has requested a budget increase for the next fiscal year—¥5.09 trillion ($42
billion)—with a focus on strengthening protection of the Senkaku Islands.120 Japanese concern over Chinese aggression is likewise reflected in
eleven security bills adopted by the Diet in September 2015 that reinterpret
Article 9 of Japan’s constitution121 to allow the JSDF to provide collective
self-defense for its allies in overseas conflicts.122
The U.S. position on the status of the Pinnacle Islands has wavered
since the end of the World War II. Following the surrender of Japan in
September 1945, U.S. forces assumed formal control over the main Japanese islands, as well as a number of other island groups including the Amani, Okinawa, Miyako and Yaeyame island chains.123 With regard to the Ry119. Japan and China Agree on Moves to Mend Ties Further, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/01/us-japan-china-idUSKCN0SQ1SY201511
01.
120. If approved, the request would be the biggest ever budget request by the Ministry of Defense, a 2.2 percent increase from the current fiscal year, and the fourth straight
annual defense budget increase. Japan Defense Ministry Asks for Record Budget, DEFENSE
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asiapacific/2015/08/31/japan-defense-ministry-asks-record-budget/71491924/.
121. Article 9 provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/
constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. The Constitution, promulgated on November 3, 1946, came into effect on May 3, 1947.
122. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reporters, “The legislation is necessary in order
to protect the people’s lives and their peaceful livelihood, and it is to prevent a war.” Mari
Yamaguchi, Japan Enhances Military’s Role as Security Bills Pass, AP (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/bf06b3fa661f47e689f6ccd50599f5d9/japan-ruling-partyfinal-push-expand-role-military.
123. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu
(Senkaku) Islands, 1945–1971, 161 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 95, 102 (2000). Japan was defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a basic directive for the occupation and control of
Japan as “the four main islands of Japan: Hokkaido (Yezo), Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku
and about 1,000 smaller adjacent islands including the Tsushima Islands.” Joint Chiefs of
Staff, J.C.S. 1380/15, Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (Nov. 3, 1945),
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ukyu Islands, U.S. Navy survey and reconnaissance operations initially did
not extend beyond Kume Island.124
However, in January 1946, the commander of the Okinawa Naval Base
was ordered “to extend Military Government operations . . . to include the
Northern Ryukyus south of the 30th parallel North and to include Sakishima Gunto,” which includes the Pinnacle Islands.125 A map issued by
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reflected that the Ryukyus
were not associated with Japan proper, nor were they part of Taiwan. 126
Japan was defined in SCAP Memorandum (SCAPIN-677) to include “the
four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku) and
the approximately one thousand smaller adjacent islands, including the
Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island).”127 Thus, official documents issued
by the U.S. State Department and the SCAP clearly associated the Pinnacle
Islands with the Okinawa prefecture.128
Declassified records from the State Department note that the United
States “rejected in toto Chinese claims to the Ryukyus” that were raised by
Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong in October 1944 and by Chiang Kaihttps://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1354730/us-jpn-rok-basic-directice-forpost-surrender.pdf.
124. Blanchard, supra note 122, at 103.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 102 n.35.
127. Excluded from the definition were
Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the Daito (Ohigashi or
Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges
(Nakano-tori) Islands], and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands.

Formosa and the Pescadores were also excluded from the definition. Memorandum from
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAPIN-677) to
Imperial Japanese Government, Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain
Outlying Areas from Japan (Jan. 20, 1946), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/SCAPIN677.
Paragraph 6 made clear, however, that it did not purport to express Allied policy with respect “to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the
Potsdam Declaration.” See also Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan
and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 11 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 63, 105–6
(2002).
128. A map issued by the SCAP in December 1947 includes the Sakishima group as
part of the Ryukyus and excludes them from the China theatre and Taiwan. Blanchard,
supra note 122, at 103.
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Shek in 1947.129 Similarly, a 1951 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-19)
by the Central Intelligence Agency “concluded that adherence to the territorial clauses of Cairo and Potsdam would require the return of the Ryukyus and Bonins to Japan.”130 Publications by U.S. Civil Administration of
the Ryukyu Islands botanists and forestry officials likewise identified the
Pinnacle Islands as part of the Ryukyus chain.131
The U.S. position at the San Francisco Peace Conference reflects that
the United States considered the Pinnacle Islands to be part of Japan. During the negotiations, the United States rejected a proposal by the allies that
Japan renounce its sovereignty over the Ryukyus in favor of U.S. sovereignty. The formula advanced by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and ultimately adopted by the conference, allowed “Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to he brought
into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.”132
The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations followed suit,
recognizing Japanese residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus Islands.133 In a
Joint Communiqué in 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower reaffirmed
the U.S. position that “Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands.”134 President John F. Kennedy similarly noted in 1963, indicating, “I
recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look
129. Mao Zedong had also implied in 1939 that the Ryukyus had been stolen from
China by the imperialists. Id. at 104.
130. Id. at 108.
131. Id. at 111 n.86. See also EGBERT H. WALKER, RYUKYU ISLANDS: PRELIMINARY
NOTES ON THE USE, DISTRIBUTION, AND ADAPTABILITY OF NATIVE AND INTRODUCED
TREE SPECIES (1952)).
132. Dulles Address, supra note 27. See also KERRY DUMBAUGH (COORDINATOR),
CONG. RESEARCH SERV, CHINA’S MARITIME TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE U.S. 21(2001); Blanchard, supra note 122, at 102, 109. The British delegate to the conference, Kenneth Younger, agreed with this approach, indicating that the SFPT “did not
remove the Ryukyus from Japanese sovereignty.” DUMBAUGH ET AL., supra note 89, at 21;
Blanchard, supra note 122, at 110.
133. “Residual sovereignty” was defined in 1969 to mean that “the United States
would not transfer its sovereignty powers [administrative, legislative and judicial] over the
Ryukyu Islands to any nation other than Japan.” Blanchard, supra note 122, at 109 n.78.
This definition was consistent with President Eisenhower’s 1957 position that residual
sovereignty meant “that the United States would exercise its rights for a period, and that
the sovereignty would then return to Japan.” Blanchard, supra note 122, at 117 n.115.
134. Joint Communiqué of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. President Eisenhower (June 21, 1957), http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPU
S/19570621.D1E.html.
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forward to the day when the security interests of the free World will permit
their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty.”135 The Johnson administration likewise “reaffirmed Japan’s residual sovereignty over the islands” in a
joint communiqué in January 1965.136
A declassified CIA report from 1971 states “the Senkaku Islands . . .
[were] generally accepted as being Japanese owned” and were not claimed
by China until December 1970 following the release of the 1969 ECAFE
report that indicated there was a high probability that large deposits of oil
may be present in the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan.137 The
report additionally states that “strong support for the Japanese claim to the
Senkakus exists not only on Japanese maps but also on maps published in
Peking and Taipei.”138 The report concludes that “the Japanese claim to
sovereignty over the Senkakus is strong, and the burden of proof of ownership would seem to fall on the Chinese.”139
Nonetheless, the U.S. position on the sovereignty issue changed to one
of neutrality during the Nixon administration. During the negotiations of
the Okinawa reversion treaty, the State Department suggested in April
1971 that “in occupying the Ryukyus and the Senkakus in 1945, and in
proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the U.S. passes no judgment as
to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which should be settled directly by the parties concerned.”140 The change in position was not, howev135. Statement by President John F. Kennedy upon Signing Order Relating to the
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (Mar. 19, 1962), http://www.presidency.ucs
b.edu/ws/?pid=9114. President Kennedy’s statement was consistent with a joint communiqué issued by the White House in June 1961 after a meeting between the President and
Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (“The President and the Prime Minister exchanged
views on matters relating to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, which are under U.S. administration, but in which Japan retains residual sovereignty.”). Blanchard, supra note 122, at
118.
136. Blanchard, supra note 122, at 118.
137. CIA SENKAKU ISLANDS INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1. See also
ECAFE REPORT, supra note 77.
138. Foreign maps cited by the report include the 1967 edition of the Soviet Union’s
official Atlas of the World, which specifically designates the Senkakus to be Japanese. CIA
SENKAKU ISLANDS INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 18–19.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) (Apr. 13, 1971), reprinted
in 17 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976: CHINA 1969–1972, at
296 (2006), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d115 [hereinafter Holdridge Memorandum]. A similar position was reflected in a State Department
cable in June 1971 (“The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed be148
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er, made because the United States believed that the islands were not Japanese territory, but rather to appease the Taiwanese government and break
the impasse of the ongoing textile negotiations in Taipei.141 The change in
position may also have been influenced by the administration’s “overtures
to China during 1971–1972, culminating in the Nixon visit to China.”142
When the Okinawa reversion treaty was presented to the U.S. Senate
for advice and consent in 1971, the Secretary of State indicated “that reversion of administrative rights to Japan did not prejudice any claims to the
islands.”143 Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Robert Starr amplified the U.S.
position in a letter dated October 20, 1971.144 Since that date, successive
fore it transferred administration of the islands to the United States nor can the United
States by giving back what it received diminish the rights of the Republic of China.”) Lee,
supra note 126, at 122–23. See also Choon-ho Park, Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast
Asia Sea-Bed Controversy, 14 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 212, 253 (1973).
141. A memorandum from the Assistant for International Economic Affairs to President Richard Nixon indicated that “the Taiwan Government feels it has taken a heavy
beating from the U.S. in recent months (oil moratorium, Two-China developments) and
that it would lose a great deal more international face if they were to settle for a disadvantageous bargain” in the textile negotiations. Therefore, Ambassador-at-Large David Kennedy had suggested, inter alia, that the United States “offer certain concessions to Taiwan”
to break the impasse “without causing disastrous side effects for either our industry or the
Taiwan Government.” Kennedy was convinced that the “only way to resolve the issues is
to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese administrative control under the
Okinawa Reversion Agreement.” Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon (June 7, 1971), reprinted in 17
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976: CHINA 1969–1972, at 341
(2006), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/pg_341. See also
Backchannel Message from the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs
(Peterson) to Ambassador Kennedy, in Taipei (June 8, 1971), reprinted in id. at 343 (2006),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/pg_343; CIA SENKAKU
ISLANDS INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 78, at 16; Eisuke Suzuki, The Origin of the Territorial Dispute of the Senkaku Islands, HOJOROHNIN’S DIARY (Nov. 4, 2013), http://ho jorohnin.hatenablog.com/entry/2013/11/04/132324.
142. DUMBAUGH ET AL., supra note 88, at 22. See also Suzuki, supra note 140.
143. In response to a question by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee regarding the sovereignty dispute over the islands, Secretary of State William
Rogers stated that “this treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands at all.” LARRY A. NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, CRS-96-798, SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE: THE U.S. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP AND OBLIGATIONS 3 (1996). See also Blanchard,
supra note 122, at 120.
144.
The . . . the Republic of China and Japan are in disagreement as to sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands. . . . [T]he People’s Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over
the islands. The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those is-
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U.S. administrations have maintained a position of neutrality concerning
the dispute.145
The change in position by the United States is somewhat contradictory
in that all U.S. administrations have stated that U.S. defense obligations
under the U.S.-Japan defense treaty apply to the Pinnacle Islands. Therefore, U.S. “neutrality,” albeit well-intended, is of little value in reducing the
growing tensions between China and Japan over the disputed islands.146
Rather, it encourages China to be more assertive by allowing it to exploit
the U.S. distinction between sovereignty and administrative control, which
helps explain the increased presence of Chinese patrol boats and aircraft
around the Pinnacle Islands since the fall of 2012.147
The ongoing dispute between China and Japan is of concern to the
United States since the Pinnacle Islands, which have been under the administrative control of Japan since 1972, fall within the scope of Article 5 of
the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.148 Relands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it
transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back
what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States . . . considers
that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.

NIKSCH, supra note 143, at 3. See also Hearing on Ex. J. 92-1 the Agreement Between the U.S.A.
and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 92nd Cong. 91 (1971).
145. See e.g,, MANYIN, supra note 100, at 6. On August 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary of
State Philip Crowley reiterated the U.S. position at a daily press briefing in Washington:
The U.S. position on this issue is longstanding and has not changed. The United States
does not take a position on the question of the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. We expect the claimants to resolve this issue through peaceful means among themselves. But Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
states that the treaty applies to the territories under the administration of Japan. . . .

Daily Press Briefing, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State (Aug.
16, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/08/146001.htm#JAPAN. See also
Daily Press Briefing, Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State (Aug. 28,
2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/08/196986.htm.
146. Dr. Henry Kissinger, one of America’s greatest statesmen, astutely observed in
1971 that the U.S. position was “nonsense.” Kissinger’s handwritten comment in the margin of a memorandum articulating the State Department’s neutrality proposal indicated:
“But that is nonsense since it gives the islands to Japan. How can we get a more neutral
position?” Holdridge Memorandum, supra note 139.
147. MANYIN, supra note 100, at 6.
148. For the text of Article 5, see supra note 53. Article II of the Okinawa reversion
treaty extends U.S. defense obligations to the islands:
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newed Chinese provocations in the vicinity of the islands have prompted
the United States to reaffirm U.S. defense obligations under Article 5 on
numerous occasions.149
It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between the
United States . . . and Japan, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States of American and Japan signed at
Tokyo on April 2,1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands. . .

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 446 (1971).
149. In August 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley reaffirmed U.S. defense obligations under Article 5 of the mutual defense treaty. Crowley, supra note 146.
Two months later, in October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton re-confirmed U.S.
obligations under the defense treaty during an official visit to Vietnam, indicating that the
United States has “made it very clear that the [Pinnacle] islands are part of our mutual
treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan.” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Remarks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem (Oct. 30, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150189.htm. In 2012, the
United States reiterated that the U.S.-Japan defense treaty applies to “any provocative set
of circumstances.” Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Scrambles Jets in Islands Dispute with China, NEW
YORK TIMES (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/world/asia/japanscrambles-jets-in-island-dispute-with-china.html?_r=0. In April 2013, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey told reporters in Beijing that he had
reminded Chinese officials that the United States will live up to its treaty obligations with
regard to the Senkakus—“In the case of Japan in particular, I was careful to remind . . .
[the Chinese] that we do have certain treaty obligations with Japan that we would honor.”
Michael Martina & Terril Yue Jones, China Calls Japan-U.S. Drill ‘Provocative,’ REUTERS
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-china-japan-islandsidUSBRE93N0N720130424. Following a January 2013 meeting with Japanese Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated the
U.S. position over the Pinnacle Islands dispute, stating that, “although the United States
does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, we acknowledge they
are under the administration of Japan and we oppose any unilateral actions that would
seek to undermine Japanese administration. . . .” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida after Their Meeting (Jan. 18,
2013), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/ 203050.htm. In
April 2013, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stressed that the United States
would live up to its defense obligations to Japan and that Washington was opposed to any
unilateral action to weaken Japan’s administrative control over the disputed islets: “The
United States does not take a position on the overall sovereignty of the islands but we do
recognize they are under the administration of Japan and fall under our security treaty
allocations.” Yasushi Azuma, Hagel Vows Defense Commitments to Japan, Including Nuclear Umbrella, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04
/30/national/politics-diplomacy/hagel-vows-defense-commitments-to-japan-includingnuclear-umbrella/. Finally, in April 2014, President Barack Obama became the first sitting
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CONCLUSION

Despite Japan’s best efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to its outstanding territorial matters, resolution of these disputes remains elusive.
Although initially inclined to discuss the status of the Northern Territories/Southern Kurile Islands, Russia recently reversed course and indicated
that there is no room for compromise on the sovereignty issue. South Korea has taken a similar position with regard to the Liancourt Rocks, repeatedly refusing Japan’s proposal to have the dispute settled through third party adjudication. Finally by elevating the status of the Pinnacle Islands dispute to a “core interest,” China has signaled that it has no intentions of
resolving the sovereignty issue amicably and will do everything in its power
to alter the status quo. Consequently, for the foreseeable future Japan must
continue to enhance its defensive capabilities and cultivate and strengthen
its alliance with the United States in order to deter aggressive countermeasures by the other disputants, as well as minimize the potential for miscalculation.

U.S. president to overtly state that the Pinnacle Islands fall under the U.S.-Japan defense
treaty: “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by
Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s
administration of these islands.” Ankit Panda, Obama: Senkakus Covered under US-Japan Security Treaty, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 24, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obamasenkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/.
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